“Historicizing Phenomenology: 
As You Like It, Adamic Knowing, and Categorial Intuition.”

In As You Like It, Duke Senior claims that in the forest “our life, exempt from public haunt, /
Finds tongues in trees, books in running brooks, / Sermons in stones” (2.1.15-17). Ardenne occupies a seam between matter and meaning, where language and thought shade into the natural world. The Duke’s forest is depicted in phenomenological terms, as a place where one can reacquaint oneself with a meaning yoked to the material world but usually covered up or forgotten. Placed alongside a retreat from “public” life and an earlier invocation of Adam’s “penalty” (2.1.5), the Duke’s words summon the first man, alone in an eloquent world into whose essence he saw and whose names he alone could provide. I argue that Adamic knowledge shadows As You Like It, and ties the play to an important but unexplored strand of phenomenology’s prehistory. When Heidegger first read Husserl, he was most impressed by the idea of “categorial intuition,” which he later described as the ability to “see universally,” to see the house as house and unite meaning with matter. Categorial intuition is a foundational concept for phenomenology that I contend traces its ancestry to Adam’s ability to see and speak the essence of things. Unpacking how this concept works in Husserl, Heidegger, and Marion, in this paper I position As You Like It as a stage for both excavating the genealogy of phenomenology and rendering Shakespeare phenomenological.

Tony Antoniades
University of Toronto

In a 1978 essay, Natalie Crohn Schmitt argued that “while the object of [medieval morality plays] is didactic, their effect is mimetic; that, more literally than the analyses have allowed, the plays provide a phenomenological account of existence, and that the concepts ‘allegory,’ ‘personified abstraction,’ and ‘universalized type’ do not account for the whole of the medieval experience of the plays.” But how to recapture the “whole of the experience?” Pierre Bourdieu predicts that between groups separated by time, “differing definitions of the impossible, the possible, and the probable cause one group to experience as natural or reasonable pratices or aspirations which another group finds unthinkable” (Outline of a Theory of Practice 78). Such is the difficulty facing any scholar of the period, or of its transition to the early modern. I want to suggest, though, that the movement known as “Theatre for Development” (TFD) might offer some insights. Following the post-Brechtian tenets of Augusto Boal’s Poetics of the Oppressed, TFD attempts to use theatre in small, often remote, third-world agrarian communities as an organ of social change. It is based on the demolition of boundaries between audience and actor, and on the equal participation of all community members. The lines are, of course, far from perfectly parallel, but some of the similarities are striking, and offer fruitful insight not only into the medieval experience of theatre, but into some of the ways in which theatrical experience changed – or did not – as one period emerged from its predecessor.

Christopher Crosbie
North Carolina State University
"Philosophies of Retribution: Genre as Phenomenological Reduction"

Can we speak of a phenomenology of genre? This essay, which will comprise part of the introduction to my current book project, will examine early modern revenge tragedy as prompting audience intentionality towards a diverse yet curiously cohesive set of doctrines from classical philosophy. The larger project investigates the influence of the Aristotelian vegetative soul on The Spanish Tragedy, the Aristotelian ethical mean on Titus Andronicus, Lucretian atomism on Hamlet, Galenic pneumatics on Antonio's Revenge, and Epictetian volition on The Duchess of Malfi. Each of these classical theories surprisingly informs the revenge trajectory within its respective play. But the vegetative soul, ethical mean, atom, vital spirit, and deepest reserves of human will also share some defining characteristics. For each seeks to understand the last waypoint, as it were, on the border between immateriality and materiality; concomitantly, each invokes a concept intelligible and not, in itself, sensible. So why does revenge tragedy, a genre renowned for being sensational and visceral, prompt audience intentionality towards that which is ontologically real yet notably not sensible in its first instance? This essay will argue that revenge tragedy's unique constellation of conventions – all of which center on the act of bringing-into-being – proves especially well-suited for bracketing as noema for audience intentionality that which is not properly sensible. By bringing such theoretical abstractions more squarely into a relational context, the genre, I will suggest, helps reveal the immediacy and political potency such otherwise distanced philosophies can hold for the suddenly marginalized or dispossessed.

Holly Dugan
George Washington University

“Shylock’s Senses”

In Against Race, Paul Gilroy argues that the senses are a key part of constructing knowledge in modern race-thinking. Arguing that there is “no raw, untrained perception dwelling in the body,” Gilroy reminds scholars “the human sensorium has had to be educated to the appreciation of racial differences.” In this paper, I take up Gilroy’s provocative claim about the multi-sensorial dimensions of modern race-thinking in order to examine its relevance within early modern models of ethnic and racial difference. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate a few of the ways in which the senses participated in an evolving sensus communis, especially in regards to beliefs about perceptible, embodied racial and ethnic differences. Focusing on a few of the many early modern plays that staged both “Jews” and “Moors” for early modern London audiences, including Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice, I argue that early modern London drama reveals a profound paradox about representing racial and ethnic difference in the renaissance: although the plays collectively offer a stunningly xenophobic assertion that ethnic and religious differences are visceral, their representations implicitly depend on complex-- and collectively shared-- experiences of sensation within the realm of the theater. The theatre was an important space of sensory pedagogy, though its lessons remain underexplored.

Consider, for example, Shylock’s famous rebuttal to his Christian tormentors on the streets of Venice: “Hath not a Jew eyes?” he asks, arguing for a model of perception that cuts across any differences between himself and Salerio: “ Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions; fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer as a Christian is?” (3.1, l. 49-61). Often read as a model for liberal tolerance, Shylock’s speech seems to argue against medieval and early modern anti-Semetic constructions of “Jews” and
their bodies. His second set of claims, however, tempers that potential, advancing a pedagogy of revenge based on a similar premise of shared phenomenological experience. Like Gilroy’s claim about the constructed sensorium that produces race-thinking, Shylock’s claim about revenge—as a villany that is first “taught” and then “executed”—demonstrates the complexity with which sensation shapes differences between Christians and Jews by invoking the realm of the stage itself and its genres. Reading Shylock’s theory of sensation against the play’s other phenomenological test of cultural difference—the casket test—I argue that Shakespeare’s *Merchant of Venice* reveals how the theater participated in the process of educating the human senses in perception of ethnic and racial difference.

**Stephanie Elsky**  
Amherst College

“Custom, Periodization, and Poetic Performance in Philip Sidney’s *Old Arcadia*”

This paper examines the intersection of legal and poetic temporality in Sidney’s *Old Arcadia* as a way to query periodizing narratives that treat the early modern as the birthplace of historicity. English common law, or, as it was often called, the “common custom of the realm,” presents a distinct challenge to this narrative. Rather than relying upon the absolute distinction between past and present, the concept of custom constructed England’s past as continuous and unbroken. By imagining English common law as having existed since “time immemorial,” early modern lawyers and politicians were able to posit a legal system without origins, and, thus, one without a princely edict at its source. When Philip Sidney introduces the eclogues, the Arcadian shepherds’ oral extemporaneous poetic performances, by announcing that there was “ever one present” to write them down, to later “polish and refine” them, he generates multiple temporalities in which this poetry is produced. He highlights the materiality of the poems we read, and their status as later codifications of a performance whose origins remain occluded. I argue that in doing so Sidney both constructs a peculiarly legal form of narrative authority but also reveals the poetic sensibility at the heart of common law. In this way, he invites us to understand the notion of absence in terms other than loss, alienation, and nostalgia.

**Jennifer Downer**  
Arizona State University

“True Time Broke”: The Hearing Subject in *Richard II*

Shakespeare’s *Richard II* is recognized as a play dealing heavily with issues of sovereign subjectivity, though the importance of temporality to subject-formation within the play remains largely unexplored. Richard’s description of himself as clockwork during the final scene of the play demonstrates his reliance on the crown as signer, which entails a highly mediated, language-bound relationship to both his sovereign status and his kingly body. Richard self-describes as someone who is tone-deaf to the moments that betray his disjointure with time, history, and his own kingly identity. Drawing on the theories of Bruno Latour and Michel Serres, who posit essence as experienced and emergent, I investigate Richard’s self-anatomizing moves and use of clockwork metaphor as, in effect, attempts to move beyond the realm of atemporal semiotics. Music, sound, and hearing are correlates of temporality throughout the play. Placing his own subjectivity (both corporal and symbolic) back into a history and temporality means becoming reacquainted with his own embodiment, particularly the modality of the ear, so
vulnerable to the “lascivious meters” of flattery. Paradoxically, Richard’s ear is both the perceiver of faulty phenomena and the phenomenal object—both doxa and noema. As such, it is a ripe metaphor for Richard’s re-tuning within a larger social and temporal network, with larger implications for kingship as phenomenon in Shakespeare.

Gary Kuchar
University of Victoria, BC

Sounding The Temple: George Herbert and the Mystery of Hearkening

Although Herbert scholars have attended closely to the musical dimensions of The Temple, no one, to my knowledge, has stepped back to ask the more general question of how sound and hearing function in it. What happens when we read The Temple by listening to its representation of sound and hearing not only as trans-historical phenomena shared through a common biology but also as they were understood in the early modern period? How does The Temple resonate differently when we attend to early modern ideas about the physics, physiology, and theology of sound — ideas that bring with them, in Bruce Smith’s words, “protocols of listening, remarkably different from ours” (Smith, O-Factor, 8)? By tuning into early modern frequencies, we will discover that hearing and sound sometimes mean different things for Herbert than they do for us and that such differences have crucial consequences for The Temple. At the same time, however, there are certain phenomenological givens that continue to animate the power of fascination that Herbert’s poems possess for many readers. By attending to both the historical differences and the inherent limits of human biology, we will see what promise historical phenomenology may hold for Herbert studies.

Jeff Steele
Principia College

“…‘howsoever thou pursuest this Act, Taint not thy mind’: Hamlet and the Difficulty of Perception in the Call for Revenge”

I hope to argue successfully that Hamlet struggles with the effects of fascination—a kind of mesmerism—during and after his interview with the Ghost of his father. In order to keep the paper from becoming a dissertation, I wish to focus only on the interview and some of the subsequent decisions Hamlet makes as he goes about his “revenge.”

My main interest is in how the proposition of revenge is presented to Hamlet and how he perceives what he is being told and what he thinks he must do. Chapters two and three of Dufrenne’s The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience are informative for an argument that attempts to examine perceptive difficulties within the shifting context of a play in performance. While acknowledging that production variables and interpretive variables must exist in performance, I plan to use the Folio text as a base source for the examination of the given content, using Q2 and Q1 renderings only for significant comparisons or illuminations.

I will begin with a brief explanation of what “fascination” meant in Early Modern England, then proceed to the interpretive analysis with observations of possible effects the Hamlet/Ghost interview might have upon the theatrical audience. I want to conclude with some thought given to Shakespeare’s treatment of reality vs. appearance in this very potent period of his career.
Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra* is a play written during the opening years of the seventeenth century which depicts events occurring in the first-century BC in a language and imagery that is at crucial moments redolent of the Book of Revelation. In my essay for our seminar I consider how these three uncontroversial facts about the play might contribute to our rethinking the categories of historical periodization which continue to inform the reception of Shakespeare in the present. My tentative hypothesis will be that the conjunction of these facts undermines the philosophy of history which subtends the contemporary valuation of "the early modern," developing in its place a conception of historical repetition and cultural hope that more closely resembles St. Augustine's and Walter Benjamin's theologies of history as developed in *The City of God* and "Theses on the Philosophy of History." While the essay focuses on the issue of periodization rather than on phenomenology per se, part of its aim is to suggest that different accounts of history imply different phenomenologies of time and temporal relation, which in turn circuitously justify the structure and significance of the epochal periodizations found in these same historical accounts.

So, for example, *Antony and Cleopatra* draws attention to the difference between the pagan account of history assumed by its characters and the Christian account of history assumed by its audience, and it does so in part by juxtaposing pagan and Christian phenomenologies of time and repetition. Indeed, I would suggest that the familiar scholarly debates about (1) whether *Antony and Cleopatra* is a history, a tragedy, or a romance, and (2) whether Octavius Caesar or its eponymous lovers should be understood as having the drama's last word, as it were, are largely debates about what account of history (and hence what phenomenology of time) are finally affirmed by the play. (Of course, as Janet Adelman has astutely observed, this latter question seems always to bleed over into the question of what account of history and what phenomenology of time a particular critic thinks are true. I agree with her that there is no escaping this difficult question for readers confronting the later plays, but I will do no more in my essay than acknowledge its discomfiting presence.)

In addition to Augustine's *City of God* and Benjamin's "Theses," my essay attempts to engage the following secondary works:

James A. Knapp
Loyola University Chicago

“Phenomenology before Phenomenology”

From its systematic development by Edmund Husserl through its more recent manifestations in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jean-Luc Marion, phenomenology can be understood to be a response to the Cartesian cogito. As such, as an attempt to get beyond Descartes’ dualism, phenomenology arrives, historically speaking, after the seventeenth-century moment in which Descartes’ method became possible, and by extension, after Shakespeare. But of course phenomenological thinking predated Husserl’s systematic articulation, as a broad range of earlier writers can be understood to have “thought phenomenologically.” In this paper I explore the ways in which a phenomenological attitude can be found in Shakespeare, one that is not precociously modern, but rather in keeping with important older intellectual traditions that
still held sway at the turn of the seventeenth century. As such I do not practice the kind of
“historical phenomenology” that Bruce Smith and others have brilliantly developed, but rather I
examine how Shakespeare can be thought of historically by exploring the intersections between
the history of philosophy and the philosophy of history out of which phenomenology as we know
it eventually emerged.

Kurt Schreyer
University of Missouri—St. Louis

“Et bonum quo antiquius, eo melius”:
Pericles, Periodization, and the Vox Clamantis of the Past

Though Ben Jonson famously accounted Pericles a “moldy” and “stale” play on account of its
medievalisms, Shakespeare foregrounded its obsolescence. The Chorus figure of “ancient”
Gower opens the play by begging those “born in these latter times / When wit’s more ripe, [to]
accept my rhymes.” Yet this recognition of diachronic change is not derisively aimed at the
medieval past. Quite the opposite. Rather than celebrate his ascendancy over Gower or the
superiority of drama over narrative romance, Shakespeare gives both authority over his own
present performance. The play, I will argue, accordingly resists a straightforwardly progressive
view of history, particularly theatrical history, by enacting its reliance on the pre-Reformation
dramatic forms of saints plays, moral interludes, and biblical drama. Michael O’Connell, Peter
Womack, and others have persuasively argued for the direct or indirect influence of such
“cultural memories” on Shakespeare. Joining their cross-period engagements, I will first
underscore the material re-presentation of those dramatic memories in Pericles. I will then
explore why Shakespeare endows a medieval subject—Gower—with what would later be denied
the Middle Ages altogether: historical consciousness. In doing so, I hope to offer a better critical
purchase on the elusive problem of periodization by showing how Shakespeare, like Benjamin’s
obdurate historical materialist, resists modernity’s alluring promise of novelty—and the
periodized histories that would later emerge to bolster it—by resurrecting shards of outmoded
and outlawed dramatic conventions and stage properties.

Thomas Ward
United States Naval Academy

“Spoken Song and Untimely Performance in Cymbeline 4.2.”

What would it have meant to speak a song on the Shakespearean stage? This question has lead to
considerable confusion among editors of Cymbeline, who see a discrepancy between the Folio’s
heading “SONG” prefacing the lament for Fidele in 4.2 and Guiderius’s declaration that because
he “cannot sing” the dirge, he will “weep and word it.” This discrepancy has led editors either to
assume that Guiderius’s lines represent an interpolation to accommodate
a pair of unmusical
actors or that the heading is the result of editorial “improving” of the text’s presentation in the
Folio. In my paper, I adopt a phenomenological approach in order to argue that the demarcation
between singing and speaking may not be as absolute as modern editors assume. I begin by
looking to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century debates about the propriety of speaking or intoning
liturgical utterances and scriptural readings. This debate, I claim, elucidates contemporary ideas
about how words and music—as sound—penetrate the body and the rational mind. Reading
Guiderius’s and Arviragus’s ostensibly pre-Roman-pagan obsequies in light of Puritanical
attitudes toward the singing voice helps to locate (and dislocate) Shakespeare’s scene in relation to the “disenchantment” often thought to accompany Reformist thought in the seventeenth century.

Colleen Kennedy
Ohio State University

“Smelling the Violet in Henry V: an Osmology of Difference”

In this paper, I begin with King Henry’s claim (while disguised as common soldier Harry Le Roy) that “The violet smells to him as it doth to me; the element shows to him as it doth to me; all his senses have but human conditions” (5.1.102-104). Not only has recent criticism (Holly Dugan, Mathew Milner, Maria Heyward) demonstrated that the monarch smelled differently than his or her subjects (smell as both transitive and intransitive verb), but early modern philosophies of smell often repeat that smell is a highly subjective sense and so the violet would smell differently to each individual. Furthermore, Shakespeare’s writings display a personal preference for the violet over the aroma of other flowers. Finally, Henry’s rhetoric is equivocative and self-nullifying; it is a petitio principii fallacy: the violet smells to him (me, Henry V) as it doth to me (me, Harry Le Roy, i.e. Henry V). I use this passage to begin a historical phenomenological consideration of how the sense of smell connects, challenges, renegotiates, and differentiates between subject and subject and/or subject and object by offering readings of a few other moments of osmological significance within Henry V: the aroma of Fluellen’s Welsh leek and the stench of rotting casualties of war.