In *The Government of Self and Others* Michel Foucault offers two ways for thinking about freedom of speech and questions of sovereignty that I would like to consider in light of the discursive ethics of women in early modern drama. First, Foucault considers a form of rhetoric called parrēsia, a term the OED defines as “free-spokenness, . . . Chiefly [in] Rhetoric. Frankness or boldness of speech.” Foucault argues that “[p]arrēsia founds democracy and democracy is the site of parrēsia. First of all then, there is this circular bond of parrēsia/democracy, each belonging to the other” (300). Second, Foucault connects rhetorical forms of parrēsia to politics, so that parrēsia becomes a form of speaking united with taking a stand. In fact, parrēsia is a right of the citizen to correct the sovereign. I argue that early modern drama stages a parrēsiatic form of citizenship that is performed by women. Through their resistance against domestic and governmental tyranny, women emerge as active citizens, speaking from a dramatic and political ethical center which, I argue, is feminist. Concerned about the power of men over women, feminine forms of parrēsia call attention to structural inequities to which women are subject. While the social and political conditions of the time place women in a complex dynamic of power and subjection, it does not follow that they are stripped of their citizenship, their right to speak the truth. In fact, the early modern stage becomes a particularly constructive space for such speaking. Emerging from this speaking is a feminist ethics that not only claims citizenship for women in early modern drama, but also defies common assumptions about feminized paradigms of virtue and deceit. In fact, I am interested in women’s points of view and acts that are troubling, not precisely in line with early modern standards of appropriate femininity, even ethically questionable. Such acts simultaneously offend, disturb, mystify our expectations of dramatic heroines, while also importantly placing women in control of their bodies, their minds, and (sometimes) their men.

In this essay, I will compare the trials of Queen Katherine in Shakespeare and Fletcher’s *King Henry VIII* and of Vittoria in Webster’s *The White Devil* in which both women claim political and rhetorical forms of parrēsia. Katherine and Vittoria reject the authority of their accusers as well as the basis for their trials. They also interrogate the procedures under which they are tried: “If you be my accuser,” Vittoria says to Monticelso, “Pray cease to be my judge” (3.2.225-26); “You are mine enemy,” Katherine accuses Wolsey, “You shall not be my judge” (2.4.75, 76). Vittoria and Katherine reject the power of their male accusers and begin to expose the corruption at the heart of their trials. Central to both *King Henry VIII* and *The White Devil*, these moments coincide with dramatic and political appraisals of governmental and religious power, then. As they speak truth to power, each woman demands a right to fair representation—to a system under which she is not a scapegoat for masculine ambition—and establishes a female form of citizenship.
the dominant mode of power shifted from early modern monarchical or absolutist rule to neoliberal
governmentality. Taking up this project in The Kingdom and the Glory, Giorgio Agamben homes in on
the intersection of these two forms of power, in what he calls an archaeology of glory and glorification,
which encompass a range of “acclamatory practices”—festivals, ceremonies, liturgies—that render
sovereign and governmental power coextensive, co-constitutive. Agamben’s historical sweep, though,
misses the early modern period’s modifications to the idea of glory. In this paper, I take up Agamben’s
archaeological approach to identify a rupture in the conceptualization of glory, manifested in, on the one
hand, such texts as Machiavelli’s Prince and Discourses and Montaigne’s “Of Glory” and, on the other,
its radical revision in Luther’s Heidelberg Disputations, in which he rejects the “theology of glory” for a
“theology of the cross,” esteeming weakness over strength, suffering over works. This paper reads these
fault lines in Shakespeare’s Coriolanus, which probes the thresholds of state and popular power through
the negotiation of ceremonial displays of suffering (via, e.g., Marcius’s wounds) and civic acclamation,
their glorification, to arrive at a more granular analysis of emerging forms of governmentality in post-
Reformation England. Glorification figures centrally in play’s conflict, through, e.g., Marcius’s wish “to
o’erleap that custom [of display] . . . for my wounds’ sake” (2.2), which denies the citizens a spectacle
that, as one describes, allows for the people “to put our tongues into those wounds and speak for them”
(2.3).

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Foucault After School:
Poverty, Aesthetics, and the Cambridge Parnassus Plays

In this paper, I propose to consider some of the links between Foucault’s late work at the Collège de
France and Giorgio Agamben’s The Highest Poverty in order to examine poverty as an aesthetic principle
in Elizabethan scholastic drama, a principle, specifically, of what Foucault’s 1983-84 lectures termed the
emergence of “artistic life” as a mode of truth. In his 2011 book, Agamben cites Foucault in discussing
monastic poverty as a form, or rule, of life irreducible to the status of law. The prospect of late medieval
or early modern art (ars) as “never-ending practice” (33) seems a fitting corrective to historicism’s
interest in the vicissitudes of the subject, were it not for the ease with which the monastic usus pauper
succumbed by the sixteenth century, according to Agamben, to the politics of exception. Agamben, for
this reason, turns in his more recent work from the arts of poverty to the arts of use (The Use of Bodies
86-7), but Foucault in his late lectures charted another trajectory: a discourse of poverty, from the ancient
Cynics to modern “Zynismus,” that enabled “the idea that art itself, whether it is literature, painting, or
music, must establish a relation to reality which is no longer one of ornamentation, or imitation, but one
of laying bare, exposure, stripping, excavation…” (188). My goal in this essay is to re-read the
Cambridge Parnassus plays – three student dramas performed between 1598 and 1601 – along this
trajectory. Typically regarded as backdrop to the Age of Shakespeare, The Pilgrimage to Parnassus
(1598) and The Return from Parnassus (1600-1) stage instead a detailed picture of poetic poverty as
literary pilgrimage in Tudor school and performance. The characters “Philomusus” and “Studioso” pursue
the travails of the “poor scholler” to the heights of Parnassus, only to discover the persistence of literary
poverty, a persistence that ultimately leads to the innovative staging of a ragged pantheon of English wits
in the plays’ theatrical judgment of “Spenser,” “Shakespeare,” “Kit Marlowe,” et al. Rather than a birth of
the author, the Parnassus plays thus suggest the birth of an autonomous, because impoverished, aesthetic.
Its picture of late Elizabethan poetry is of an art of veridiction sitting uncomfortably between the
disciplined subject and practicing self that has so often colloquially defined the question of late Foucault,
even as it imagines a form of life that makes that art visible.
International Governmentality, Security and Treasure in Marlowe’s The Massacre at Paris

This paper’s point of departure is the role of fiscal policy in Marlowe’s play. The play’s Machiavellian antagonist, the Duke of Guise, draws attention to the international and domestic flows of wealth that make up his own personal treasury and that fund his project of murdering Protestants. Where the Duke of Guise understands his actions as key to French security, other characters, primarily Henry III, understand confessional antagonism as antithetical to national safety and wellbeing. The paper uses Foucault’s work on governmentality, drawing especially on scholarship that has sought to extend Foucault’s insights to the domain of international interaction, to help understand these competing accounts of funding and governing security. In particular, the reign of Henry III brings to the fore a model of international relations skeptical of the value of confessional conflict over and against the claims of peace. What is most striking, and most resonant with Foucault’s genealogy of liberal modes of governance, is the way Henry III defines peace as a governmental dispensation preferable because it is cheaper than war. The paper argues not that Marlowe strives to advocate for or against liberal rationalities of governance, but that his plays are interested in exploring the irreducible antagonisms that condition and limit rule.

The primary works of Foucault informing this study are his Collège de France lecturers published under the titles Security, Territory, Population and The Birth of Biopolitics.

Social Non/Issues, Sovereign Power, and Bio-Power in Early Modern England

This paper places Michel Foucault’s late lectures on biopolitics and the first volume of The History of Sexuality into conversation with early modern representations of sovereign power and women associated with biological reproduction. The paper’s purpose, in part, is to begin to parse out how depictions of such women in certain early modern English discourse were tied to prevalent notions of sovereign power and social reproduction. In a famous passage of the first volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault describes how the mechanisms through which power operated began to exhibit a “profound transformation” in the seventeenth century. “The sovereign exercised his right of life…by exercising his right to kill”; this right “is now manifested as…the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life.” Whereas states once relied on the “juridical existence of sovereignty” and the exercise of sovereign power, they came to rely on the “biological existence of a population” and what Foucault calls “bio-power.” Although Foucault rarely foregrounds the interrelationships between women, social reproduction, and state power (i.e., either sovereign power or bio-power) in his exposition, thinkers like Penelope Deutscher demonstrate that his work invites the theorization of how all three maintain, threaten, and—more generally—interact with each other. Examining early modern legal documents and drama, this paper considers not only the interplay between women, state power, and social reproduction but also how women assumed to be capable of procreating elucidate the supplementary relationship between bio-power and sovereign power in the period’s discourse. Relatedly, the paper argues that attending to interchanges between mechanisms of sovereign power and bio-power may shed light on why even a single text may seem to afford women and their offspring the utmost significance in one passage and then appear to render them insignificant in another.
Pastoral Sovereignty? Foucault and *King Lear* on Vigilant Care

In this paper I read King Lear’s sleep in light of Michel Foucault’s lectures from *Security, Territory, Population* on pastoral power and its perfectionist model of care. Foucault tracks images of godly power and pastoral care from ancient Egypt’s Ra to Plato’s *Statesman* to the *Rule of St. Benedict*, uncovering a line of thought that represents the pastor’s devotional attention as a duty to remain always watchful and vigilant while caring for the spiritual benefit of the flock. These are also the terms in which King James I figures his imagined role as both sovereign and shepherd of England’s body politic, when advising his son Charles that the king must be “a great watchman and shepheard…and his eye must neuer slumber nor sleepe for the care of his flocke.” It is therefore no wonder that Shakespeare’s vision of the tragic deaths of sleeping monarchs in both *Hamlet* and *Macbeth* suggests the normative force of sovereign vigilance, while also underscoring its practical impossibility given the body natural’s need to restore its physical life through sleep. In *King Lear*, Shakespeare further develops the implications of sovereign sleep in the latter direction, underscoring its restorative virtues for both physical and ethical life while taking as central the problem of King Lear’s care—of the body politic, of his family, and ultimately of himself, as suggested by Regan’s claim in the first scene that her father “hath ever but slenderly known himself.” I argue that Lear’s split from the body politic opens up the possibility of a new ethics of care in the play, inspired by the stoic dictum that “ethics is physics” and which Shakespeare places in direct tension with the political-theological synthesis of monarchical vigilance and pastoral power as the normative model for kingly care.

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‘Enfreedoming thy person’: *Love’s Labour’s Lost* and Afghanistan

“My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous.”

In Shakespeare’s *Love’s Labour’s Lost*, the “clown” Costard is jailed for fraternizing with a woman. When his keeper, Armado, requires a service of Costard, he frames his order in terms of liberation. Armado announces that he will “enfranchise” Costard. When Costard fails to understand, he replies that he aims to set Costard “at liberty, enfreedoming thy person. Thou wert immured, restrained, captivated, bound…I give thee thy liberty, set thee from durance” (3.1.109-116). The irony in which obedience and service are rendered a means to personal freedom satirizes the nascent liberal project, which, following the work of David Glimp, I will argue is at work in the plot of this play. I aim to show that Shakespeare brings to light the latent dangers that adhere to such utopian governmentality. I will then consider a “global” production of the play and its aftermath in Kabul, Afghanistan in 2005. A liberal project, celebrated by producers, actors and audience members as a staging of women’s liberation, the performances contributed to a personal tragedy for one of the women actors, with repercussions that continue to today. Through the work of Foucault, this play and these performances, we can see how the form of biopolitics he named governmentality is in itself neither good nor bad. Nevertheless, the rule of individuals and populations which we ourselves experience as we identify with the sub-populations to which we belong and through which we are governed or govern others is ethically dangerous and requires ever attentive scrutiny. Further, the example is a warning about the inherent danger of neoliberal tendencies in “global” performances of Shakespeare.
Utopian Hybrids

[No Abstract. Essay addresses the monstrous in texts by Michel de Montaigne and Margaret Cavendish in relation to Foucault’s 1974-75 lecture series, Abnormal.]

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Preparation for What?
Stoic Practice and Epistemological Indifference in Much Ado about Nothing

Michel Foucault, in his lectures at the Collège de France, reads Stoic texts with a care and complexity not evinced in his published work. My essay takes up Foucault’s use of Stoicism as a set of practices that disengages from both Platonic desire for knowledge and Christian desire for transcendence. Instead, Stoicism, for Foucault, focuses on ascetics as both a philosophical medium and telos. Rather than prepare for salvation, Stoicism focuses on preparation as its own end, even at the risk of disengaging itself from any concern for knowledge. While this line of thinking is potentially solipsistic, it also liberates analysis of works that play with Stoic themes, such as Much Ado about Nothing, which I take up here.

Shakespeare’s play comically realizes Stoicism’s emphasis on judgment and self-cultivation, and in doing so suggests possibilities of community and character not founded on concerns for truth.

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The Affective Politics of Joy in Milton’s England

Early modern English Protestants paradoxically describe the experience of rapture as a feeling of unspeakable joy. So too do contemporary philosophers of affect describe joy—a pre-cognitive, proto-sensational experience registering becoming—as beyond linguistic capture. Leveraging this shared conceptualization of extra-linguistic joy into a dialogue between Protestant theology and affect theory, this paper argues that the post-facto naming of bodily and spiritual rapture as an experience of unspeakable joy in Reformation England provides access to theories of political freedom beyond those conceptualized by Western epistemologies of liberalism. The rhetoric joy of spiritual joy becomes politicized during the Puritan Revolution (1640–60) as transformations to the national church, parliament, and monarchy lead to increasing millenarian expectation and prophetic expression. I fashion Brian Massumi’s conceptualization of joy as a vitality affect to Reformation England through Foucault’s lectures on pastoral power in order to theorize early modern affect in relation to the governance of both bodies and souls. As the Reformation situates the Word as the primary object of Protestant joy, the indwelling Holy Spirit becomes a crucial mediating space between the Word and the Christian, a space of thinking faith affectively. Because spiritual joy was considered a duty in Protestant thought, joy and its embededness in a broader economy of grace thus becomes a crucial index during the Puritan Revolution through which radial Protestants consider the connection between religious subjectivity and political activity.
An essay I recently published on *Othello* argues that the play depicts the psychological torture of the title character by his scheming ensign, Iago. Twice in the play’s pivotal scene, Othello says Iago tortures him: “Thou hast set me on the rack!” (3.3.336); “If thou dost slander her and torture me / Never pray more” (3.3.369–70). In this essay, I ponder a different question about Othello’s torture by examining it not as a psychological or metaphorical matter, but as a biopolitical one, and in particular as a manifestation of what Foucault, in “Society Must Be Defended,” would call an early version of the race wars he locates as one of the origins of biopower in the modern West.